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2  Abstract 
In view of the operational validation of EGNOS, some early tests are being performed 
with the EGNOS System Test Bed (ESTB). This prototype has been broadcasting an 
EGNOS-like signal since early 2000. The performance of ESTB is reduced compared 
to the full-deployed EGNOS, but it gives the opportunity to test EGNOS equipment 
and gain experience. Eurocontrol, skyguide and the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Lausanne (EPFL) are active in data collection and analysis in order to 
study the signal-in-space performance for the civil aviation users. 
The objective of this work was to analyse the system’s performance during flight tests 
in the Swiss Alps where the topography is a challenge for satellite-based navigation 
systems. Sion regional airport was selected for its location in a valley surrounded by 
very high mountains. Moreover, the use of EGNOS on regional places is expected to 
bring significant operational benefits. A new GNSS procedure including both the 
approach and a special missed-approach with a 89° turn in the valley was designed 
for these tests. A total of 13 approaches and missed-approaches were flown in 
November 2002 by a Dornier 128 belonging to the Technical University of 
Braunschweig (TUBS) and a King Air 100 belonging to SENASA (Sociedad para las 
Enseñanzas Aeronáuticas Civiles S.A.). Around 8 hours of data were recorded from 
different receivers on the ground and in the air. 
This paper shows that the accuracy and integrity obtained during the tests with the 
EGNOS System Test Bed fulfils the stringent requirements of civil aviation even in a 
difficult environment. However, some progress still has to be made on the availability 
and continuity parameters. This will be the case once the real EGNOS will be 
operational. It also demonstrates that EGNOS-based procedures are feasible and 
that it could bring important operational benefits to regional places with a limited 
ground navigation infrastructure. 
3  Introduction 
skyguide, the Swiss Air Navigation Services Provider (ANSP), is taking part in the 
EGNOS development through its involvement in the EGNOS Operators and 
Infrastructure Group (EOIG), in the European Satellite Services Provider (ESSP) and 
in the GNSS-I Operational Validation (GOV) working group. As an ANSP, it will be 
responsible for providing the EGNOS service to the civil aviation community in 
Switzerland. For this purpose, the signal-in-space will have to be validated against 
the requirements of the Annex 10 to the convention of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) [1] once it becomes operational. Preparatory work has already 
started at skyguide. Eurocontrol, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, is coordinating the efforts of its member states in the GNSS (Global 
Navigation Satellite System) program. For what concerns EGNOS, Eurocontrol set 
up the GOV working group. This group, composed of the main European ANSPs, is 
assessing the technical performance of SBAS (Space Based Augmentation Systems) 
in view of the future operational use by civil aviation. Early EGNOS demonstrations 
and tests have been performed recently by the GOV members, using the EGNOS 
System Test Bed (ESTB). One good example of this work is the Nice flight trials, 
where an SBAS-equipped aircraft flew a curved approach into Nice airport in 
September 2001 [2]. 
In order to take a step forward, skyguide and Eurocontrol decided to conduct ESTB 
flight trials in Switzerland in 2002. This country offers a challenging mountainous 
environment with peaks up to 4600 metres in its alpine region. This particular aspect 
was not assessed during the Nice flight trials, and it is of great interest for all GNSS-
related applications. Sion’s regional airport was selected as a good example of a 
demanding location. It lies in the East-West oriented Rhone valley at an altitude of 
400 metres and is surrounded by mountains (see Figure 1). Because of this particular 
topography, the airport is difficult to manage in terms of radio navigation aids, and a 
GNSS-based infrastructure is expected to bring significant benefits. In particular, the 
missed-approach could benefit from this new guidance system. 
 
Figure 1: Sion Airport 
The objective of these tests was to determine the potential of SBAS in a mountainous 
environment. To do so, data have been collected during flight trials and then 
processed. The four major parameters used to define the performance of a 
navigation system (accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity) have been 
computed, analysed and compared to the civil aviation requirements. The Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne also took part in these trials. The aim of 
this research is the development of analysis tools for the monitoring of the EGNOS 
signals. In a first step, the ionospheric corrections were analysed [3].  
4  The EGNOS System Test Bed 
The ESTB is an EGNOS prototype, available since February 2000, that allows users 
to perform early tests and developments. It consists of 13 reference stations 
collecting GPS data over Europe and two processing centres in Toulouse, France, 
and Hönefoss, Norway (see Figure 2). The augmentation message is broadcast to 
the users via two Inmarsat geostationary satellites, the Atlantic Ocean Region East 
(AOR-E) and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Because of its reduced size compared 
to EGNOS, the performances of this test system will not be as good as the future 
operational system. The service area is also of reduced size. 
 
Figure 2: The EGNOS System Test Bed 
During the tests, the ESTB was operating in mode 2 and in accordance with the 
DO229B RTCA standards [4]. This means that pseudorange corrections and 
ionospheric corrections were provided to the user. The GPS satellites clock 
corrections were also broadcast, but no orbit corrections were available. On 
November 18th 2002, all of the ESTB reference stations were available. However, on 
November 27th 2002, the two Italian stations at Fucino and Matera were not usable 
due to maintenance activities. The AOR-E geostationary satellite was the one used to 
provide corrections during the tests because of its higher elevation angle at the Sion 
location than IOR. The GPS constellation [5] was composed of 28 operational 
satellites, but PRN21 being unusable, only 27 satellites were available. 
5  Test Procedure 
The current instrument flight procedure in Sion relies on an Instrument Guidance 
System (IGS) with a 6° glide slope and an offset of 7° relative to the runway. The 
minimum descent altitude on the IGS is 3000 ft above the aerodrome elevation for 
adequately trained crew and the last 7 nautical miles of this approach have to be 
flown in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). The departure from Sion is even 
more difficult due to the surrounding mountains, which can be as high as 4000 
metres. Aircraft must be capable of high climb gradients even in the case of an 
engine failure. Under difficult meteorological conditions, it is common that pilots have 
to remain on the ground until the weather improves. 
skyguide’s instrument flight procedure team defined a new test approach procedure, 
with the objective to overcome some of the above-mentioned limitations (see Figure 
3). It starts at SANET at 16000 ft and follows the current procedure up to ALETO. 
From this point, the SBAS procedure is different. The final approach starts at ALETO 
and ends at GS001 at 4520 ft. If the pilot then initiates a missed-approach, it follows 
the valley’s topography and makes a right turn at GS002, therefore avoiding the very 
high surrounding mountains. The climb gradient of this missed approach is much 
lower than the current one, therefore allowing low-performance aircraft to fly the 
procedure safely. More flexibility is also offered by this procedure, allowing the pilot to 
chose to perform a new approach or divert to another airport like Geneva. The 
minimum descent altitude of the approach part is only slightly improved, due to the 
current stringent PANS-OPS (Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Aircraft 
operations) procedure design criteria. 
 
Figure 3: The new SBAS test procedure 
Because of the challenging topography of the region, it is not possible to use 
conventional terrestrial-based radio navigation aids to fly the missed-approach part of 
this procedure in instrumental conditions. Therefore, the only possible solution is to 
use a satellite-based type of guidance. EGNOS is expected to have the flexibility to 
perform such operations, while fulfilling the very stringent civil aviation requirements 
in terms of accuracy and integrity [1]. This is the reason why the ESTB was chosen to 
provide guidance. This system being only a prototype, the test flights were requested 
to take place in VMC, for safety reasons. 
Two entities were selected by Eurocontrol to fly the test procedure. The first one is 
the Technical University of Braunschweig (TUBS) in Germany who owns a Dornier 
DO128-6. A total of 7 approaches and 7 missed approaches for a flight time of 3 
hours and 57 minutes were flown on November 18th 2002. A King Air A-100 operated 
by SENASA (Sociedad para las Enseñanzas Aeronáuticas Civiles S.A.) and 
equipped by GMV and Aena flew another 6 approaches and 6 missed approaches on 
November 27th 2002 during 3 hours and 45 minutes. The shared use of the airspace 
in the vicinity of Sion resulted in an operative limitation of the maximum useable flight 
altitude. During the test flights all movements were requested to remain at or below 
13000ft. For this reason, the final approach point was redefined at GS004, allowing 
an intercept of the final path at 13000ft. 
6  Receivers setup 
The TUBS aircraft was equipped with three separate dual-frequency Novatel GPS 
antennas. A signal splitter delivered the signal from the first antenna to a Stanford 
User Platform and to an OEM3 GPS-only receiver. The Stanford User Platform 
includes a Millennium Novatel receiver and provided guidance information to the pilot 
in the form of a Course Deviation Indicator (CDI). A Novatel OEM3 SBAS-capable 
receiver used the second antenna and logged raw GPS and ESTB data on a 
computer using the Slog utility from Novatel. The third antenna used a second signal 
splitter to feed both a Novatel OEM4 Data logger and a Septentrio DL Pola-Rx2. Both 
the Novatel Data Logger and the Septentrio receiver had the capability to store raw 
data on an internal memory card. 
The SENASA plane was equipped with one dual-frequency Novatel GPS antenna 
feeding two SBAS-capable Novatel receivers. One Millennium STD WAAS Propak 
receiver was providing guidance information to the pilot via the Flight Management 
System (FMS) and one OEM4 was configured to store raw data. 
Two SBAS-capable Novatel receivers were located at two different locations on the 
airport, some hundreds of metres apart. They were simultaneously collecting GPS 
and ESTB data in order to assess the system performance for a static user. 
Moreover, they were used as reference stations with the objective to compute the 
true trajectory of the aircraft. Two additional stations belonging to the AGNES 
(Automatisches GPS Netz Schweiz) permanent GPS network from swisstopo (Swiss 
Federal Office of Topography) and located 20 and 35 km away from Sion were also 
used for this purpose. Two Leica System 500 geodetic receivers belonging to EPFL 
were collecting GPS data for precise positioning of the antennas in the WGS84 
(World Geodetic System 1984) reference system. 
The data recorded with the Novatel OEM3 receiver during flight 1 on 18.11.02 are not 
complete due to a configuration change during the flight. In addition, the SBAS 
receivers did not compute any position at the beginning of this flight because some 
ESTB data were missing due to a reconfiguration of the system. 10 epochs are 
missing for the Novatel OEM3 during flight 1 on 27.11.02, probably due to a problem 
with the receiver itself because the other receivers performed well at the same time. 
In addition, the ground Novatel OEM4 receiver stopped logging data at one stage 
during flight 2. During flight 2 on 27.11.02, both the onboard OEM3 and OEM4 
receivers experienced some problems at the same time, while the ground receivers 
performed well. This was due to the ionospheric corrections being unavailable for one 
GPS satellite and the aircraft position at that moment. 
7  Data processing 
The data post-processing was performed using PEGASUS version 2.0 [6]. This 
software has been developed by Eurocontrol with the support of TUBS and is 
compliant with RTCA standards DO229B [4]. The first step was to convert binary 
Novatel data into the standard PEGASUS ASCII format. Then, a position solution and 
the corresponding protection levels were computed. The protection levels are 
designed to provide users with an upper bound on their position error, therefore 
providing the integrity information needed for safety-of-life applications. As required 
by the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) [1], a first-order 
smoothing filter with a 100 seconds time constant was applied to the raw 
measurements. 
In order to assess the performance of the ESTB positioning, the true position of the 
aircraft had to be determined for the whole duration of the flights. For this purpose, 
GPS code and carrier measurements from stations on the ground and receivers in 
the plane were used. In a first step, the coordinates of the ground receivers were 
determined using a precisely surveyed reference point in the neighbourhood and two 
Leica System 500 geodetic receivers belonging to EPFL. A dual frequency differential 
GPS carrier phase solution with fixed integer ambiguities was then computed using 
the GrafNav post-processing software version 6.03. Baselines from the different base 
stations were merged together by GrafNav, allowing optimal results to be computed. 
As this solution typically provides a 1-sigma accuracy of 0.1 metre or better, it was 
used as the true trajectory of the aircraft. 
8  Analysis Methodology 
Different types of operations are defined by the ICAO SARPS [1]. Besides the well 
known Precision Approaches going from Category 1 to Category 3, new types of 
approaches using GNSS lateral and vertical guidance have been defined. The so-
called Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV) are defined in terms of accuracy, 
integrity, availability and continuity (see Table 1). Their respective Alert Limits are 
also defined (see Table 2). 
A definition for each parameter can be found in [7]. The accuracy is defined as the 
position error that will be experienced by a user with a certain probability at any 
instant in time and at any location in the coverage area. In general, the probability is 
required to be 95%. The integrity risk is defined as the probability that a user will 
experience a position error larger than the Alert Limit without an alarm being raised 
within the specified Time-to-Alarm at any instant in time and at any location in the 
coverage area. The availability is the probability that a user is able to determine his 
position with the required accuracy and is able to monitor the integrity of his 
determined position at any instant in time and at any location in the coverage area. 
The continuity is defined as the probability that a user is able to determine his 
position with the required accuracy and is able to monitor the integrity of his 
determined position at any location in the coverage area over a minimum time 
interval applicable to the corresponding phase of flight. 
 
Operation Horizontal 
Accuracy 
95% 
Vertical 
Accuracy 
95% 
Integrity Time-to-
alert 
Continuity Availability
NPA 220 m N/A 1-1·10-7/h 10 s 1-1·10-4/h 
to 
1-1·10-7/h 
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
APV-I 220 m 20 m 1-2·10-7 
per 
approach 
10 s 1-8·10-6 in 
any 15 s 
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
APV-II 16.0 m 8.0 m 1-2·10-7 
per 
approach 
6 s 1-8·10-6 in 
any 15 s 
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
Cat 1 16.0 m 6.0 m to 
4.0 m 
1-2·10-7 
per 
approach 
6 s 1-8·10-6 in 
any 15 s 
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
Table 1: ICAO requirements for GNSS 
 
Operation Horizontal Alert Limit Vertical Alert Limit 
NPA 556 m N/A 
APV-I 556 m 50 m 
APV-II 40.0 m 20.0 m 
Cat-1 40.0 m 15.0 m to 10.0 m 
Table 2: Alert Limits for different operations 
 
For each sample, a comparison between the PEGASUS result and the true trajectory 
was performed. As the same antenna was always used for the truth reference and 
the ESTB solution, no offset was taken into account. By computing the position 
difference, the Navigation System Error (NSE) was evaluated. This was divided into 
the Horizontal Position Error (HPE) and the Vertical Position Error (VPE). For each, 
flight, the 95 percent value of this error was computed and compared to the SARPS 
requirements. 
The integrity of the navigation solution was also assessed using the Horizontal 
Protection Level (HPL) and Vertical Protection Level (VPL) values computed by 
PEGASUS. These values depend on the quality of the corrections that are being sent 
by the ESTB and the satellite constellation’s geometry relative to the user. An 
integrity failure exists if the HPE is greater than the HPL or if the VPE is greater than 
the VPL. If this happens, the system is said to be sending Misleading Information (MI) 
to the user. If, in addition, the HPE or the VPE exceeds the corresponding alert limit 
then this is referred to as Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI). If an HMI 
occurs, then the user should be warned within the time-to-alert specified by the 
phase of flight. 
The availability of each type of operation is defined as the percentage of the time 
where the system was fulfilling the accuracy and integrity requirements. When either 
protection level is higher than the corresponding alert limit, the system is said to be 
unavailable for the intended operation. 
A continuity of service analysis has also been performed. Analyses were performed 
on intervals of 15 seconds when the navigation function was available at the start of 
the interval for the intended operation. If, during this time interval, the system was 
declared not available due to a protection level becoming higher than the alert limit, 
then a continuity failure was declared. 
Finally, a Flight Technical Error (FTE) analysis has been conducted between the 
waypoints GS004 and GS001. FTE refers to the accuracy with which the aircraft is 
controlled. It was computed as the lateral and vertical difference between the ESTB 
indicated position and the desired flight path. It usually depends on whether the 
aircraft is flown by hand by the pilot or by the autopilot. Although the FTE 
determination was not the main objective of these trials, it was expected to provide 
interesting results. 
These analyses were first performed for each entire flight, which comprised 3 or 4 
approaches. A subsequent and more detailed analysis looked at the different phases 
of flight corresponding either to an approach, a missed approach or the transition 
flight. Data from each SBAS-capable receiver was used in order to perform 
comparisons between different receivers, different phases of flight and different 
locations. 
9  Results 
9.1 Geostationary satellite availability 
A preliminary analysis of Sion’s topography (see Figure 4) showed that the AOR-E 
geostationary satellite should always be visible during the entire flight down to the 
ground. The highest mountain has an elevation angle of 20° towards the South, while 
the AOR-E satellite has an elevation angle of 32° at an azimuth of 210°. As a 
comparison, the IOR satellite can only be seen at an elevation angle of 14° at an 
azimuth of 115°. The flight tests confirmed the AOR-E availability, as no loss of this 
satellite was observed, either due to terrain masking or aircraft manoeuvres. 
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Figure 4: The horizon at Sion Airport with the AOR-E (*) and IOR (o) geostationary 
satellites 
9.2 Accuracy 
The accuracy figures for the different receivers on 18.11.02 are shown in Table 3. 
Those for the 27.11.02 are shown in Table 4. 
 
Location Flight Duration Receiver HPE 95% VPE 95% 
Airborne 1 4594 s Novatel OEM3 1.2 m 2.1 m 
Airborne 2 7721 s Novatel OEM3 1.3 m 3.4 m 
Airborne 2 7721 s Novatel OEM4 1.3 m 4.6 m 
Ground 1 4703 s Novatel OEM3 0.9 m 2.2 m 
Ground 1 4705 s Novatel OEM4 0.9 m 1.7 m 
Ground 2 5873 s Novatel OEM4 1.0 m 3.2 m 
Table 3: Accuracy of the different receivers on 18.11.02 
 
Location Flight Duration Receiver HPE 95% VPE 95% 
Airborne 1 6931 s Novatel OEM3 1.2 m 1.5 m 
Airborne 1 6941 s Novatel OEM4 1.2 m 1.6 m 
Airborne 2 6483 s Novatel OEM3 1.8 m 1.6 m 
Airborne 2 6559 s Novatel OEM4 1.8 m 1.4 m 
Ground 1 6941 s Novatel OEM4 1.0 m 1.5 m 
Ground 2 6601 s Novatel OEM3 1.6 m 1.7 m 
Ground 2 6601 s Novatel OEM4 1.6 m 1.5 m 
Table 4: Accuracy of the different receivers on 27.11.02 
No significant difference appears between the different phases of flight and the 
different receivers in terms of accuracy. HPE on Flight 2 (27.11.02) is worse than the 
average. It is the same for VPE on Flight 2 on (18.11.02). The changing satellite 
constellation during the different flights can explain such behaviours. The comparison 
between static and dynamic data seems to indicate that the static measurements 
have a slightly better accuracy. 
9.3 Integrity 
In the entire data set analysed, which comprises a little bit less than 8 hours of flight, 
no misleading information was discovered. The integrity was always provided with 
the protection levels overbounding the position error. A typical Stanford plot 
representing one flight can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Stanford plot for integrity analysis 
9.4 Availability 
Using PEGASUS, the availability of each type of operation has been determined. The 
figures for horizontal Category 1 (H Cat-1), vertical APV-I (V APV-I), APV-II (V 
APV-II) and Category 1 (V Cat-1) can be seen in Figure 6 for the 18.11.02 and in 
Figure 7 for the 27.11.02. 
 
Figure 6: Availability figures for flights 1 and 2 (F1 and F2) and receivers OEM3 and 
OEM4 on 18.11.02 
 
 
Figure 7: Availability figures for flights 1 and 2 (F1 and F2) and receivers OEM3 and 
OEM4 on 27.11.02 
The availability of horizontal Category 1 and vertical APV-I is always 100%, except 
on one flight. In order to explain the important variations of availability of the other 
operations, the number of satellites used by PEGASUS and the corresponding 
Dilution Of Precision (DOP) factor are shown in Table 5. 
 
Satellites HDOP VDOP 
Date Flight Receiver 
Min Mean Mean Max Mean Max 
18.11.02 1 OEM3 6 8.5 1.2 2.3 1.6 3.2 
18.11.02 2 OEM3 4 7.4 1.2 3.3 1.9 5.0 
18.11.02 2 OEM4 4 6.8 1.2 3.2 2.2 6.9 
27.11.02 1 OEM3 4 6.0 1.8 3.3 2.5 5.2 
27.11.02 1 OEM4 4 6.1 1.7 3.3 2.4 5.2 
27.11.02 2 OEM3 4 6.5 1.4 12.1 1.9 5.4 
27.11.02 2 OEM4 4 6.6 1.3 4.3 1.8 5.4 
Table 5: Number of satellites used by PEGASUS for each flight and the 
corresponding DOP factors 
The large variations in availability can be explained by the increased vertical errors 
during some parts of the flights. These are mainly due to the small number of GPS 
satellites being used in the navigation solution and a corresponding increase in the 
DOP factors. This effect is due to the reduced number of ESTB monitoring stations 
meaning that some satellites or ionospheric grid points are not monitored constantly. 
The position of Switzerland on the edge of the ESTB coverage area is a negative 
factor for what concerns availability. 
9.5 Continuity of service 
The continuity figures observed during the tests are shown in Figure 8 for the flights 
on 18.11.02 and in Figure 9 for the 27.11.02. The continuity is separated in 
Horizontal (H Cat-1) and Vertical (V APV-I, V APV-II, V Cat-1) continuity, as it is the 
case for the other parameters. 
 
Figure 8: Continuity figures for flights 1 and 2 (F1 and F2) and receivers OEM3 and 
OEM4 on 18.11.02 
 
Figure 9: Continuity figures for flights 1 and 2 (F1 and F2) and receivers OEM3 and 
OEM4 on 27.11.02 
No significant differences between the different phases of flights and receivers have 
been observed. The horizontal continuity value for Category 1 operations was always 
100%, except for the OEM3 receiver on the second flight on 27.11.02 where it was 
99.77%. The vertical continuity for APV-I was always 100%. The continuity figures 
are usually higher than the availability ones because the periods where the system is 
unavailable are grouped together. 
9.6 Flight Technical Error 
Flight Technical Error and Total System Error (TSE) results for one approach during 
flight number 1 on 18.11.02 are shown in Figure 10. These results show that the FTE 
is at least one order of magnitude higher than the NSE. The main part of the TSE 
therefore comes from the FTE. This is partly due to the fact that the pilots were flying 
the procedure by hand using a CDI. 
 
Figure 10: Flight Technical Error (FTE), Navigation System Error (NSE) and Total 
System Error (TSE) for one approach 
9.7 Pilot’s feedback and procedure benefits 
Both crews were positive on the operational benefits of such navigation systems in 
mountainous terrain, such as the Rhone Valley in the vicinity of Sion airport. The 
procedure was easy to fly, even if some changes might be requested on the avionics 
side that could help reduce the FTE. The current system specifications require that 
the CDI sensitivity changes at 30NM from the Airport Reference Point (ARP) and on 
short final at 2NM. This "rectangular sensitivity zone" is a significant adaptation on 
the "conical zones" such as found for Instrument Landing System (ILS) approaches. 
The deviation indication should decrease step-wise while approaching the landing 
threshold. The used criteria were too restrictive in the Rhone valley and improvement 
of the PANS-OPS criteria should be foreseen after the evaluation of flight data. One 
of the crews indicated that the use of such a system below the minimum safe altitude 
requires the full and certified deployment of the EGNOS system. 
EGNOS and its architecture proved to be an easy and low-cost system for the 
implementation of precise navigational solutions on remote airfields or on 
topographically difficult environments such as Sion. In further steps, the redesign of 
departures and possibly segmented approaches would increase the availability and 
the operational use of Sion. Currently the IGS approach (using a 6°-approach angle) 
limits the choice of aircraft to Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft (RJ85/100, 
ATR42/72, etc.). A redesign of the procedure with a less steep descent angle could 
facilitate the approach to other types of operations. 
Furthermore, on a more global basis, the use of EGNOS would increase the 
availability of the navigation solution, in view of the implementation of P-RNAV or 
even RNP-RNAV. This is particularly valid when losing the line of sight of the remote 
DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) stations situated on the other side of the 
alpine chain. 
10  Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to assess the current ESTB performance for an 
aviation user in Switzerland. The accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity 
parameters were assessed based on the SARPS requirements. 
During the tests, the ESTB always fulfilled the 95% horizontal accuracy requirement 
of 16.0 metres and the 95% vertical accuracy requirement of 6.0 metres for a 
precision approach of Category 1. Only on one flight the Vertical Position Error 
exceeded the more stringent accuracy limit of 4.0 metres for Category 1. However, 
the limited number of samples collected during this study does not allow us to draw 
significant conclusions from a statistical point of view. The comparison between static 
and dynamic data seems to show that the static measurements have a better 
accuracy. The Navigation System Error observed during the tests was significantly 
smaller than the Flight Technical Error, which is the driving factor of the Total System 
Error. 
No integrity failure was detected during the tests. The protection levels always 
overbounded the position errors and therefore correctly protected the user. More 
analysis would be necessary to demonstrate that the integrity requirements are 
always fulfilled. 
The horizontal availability up to Category 1 and the vertical availability up to APV-I 
were always 100%, except on one flight. However, large variations were detected in 
the APV-II and Category 1 vertical availability. This is due to the reduced 
infrastructure of the ESTB in terms of monitoring stations. 
The continuity of service figures show that, except on one flight, no continuity failures 
occur for the horizontal Category 1 and vertical APV-I type of approach. For the more 
stringent operations, the continuity was lower than the SARPS requirements. 
In conclusion, the ESTB performed very well during the tests, even if some progress 
still has to be made for some parameters. The introduction of EGNOS is expected to 
solve much of the current shortcomings. From an operational point of view, the use of 
EGNOS at regional airports and in challenging mountainous terrain has proved to 
provide significant benefits. The benefits that could be gained in the 
missed-approach part of flight have clearly been demonstrated. The pilots’ feedback 
after the test was positive even if the procedure was impressive to fly. 
The experience gained in data collection and processing with the ESTB was very 
valuable. The results obtained were very promising for EGNOS but more work has to 
be performed. In particular, the development of tools that would allow each individual 
correction type to be validated is of great interest. Developments are currently taking 
place both at Eurocontrol and EPFL. 
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